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Benjamin Bagley
Crucially, blame can be addressed to its targets, as an implicit demand for recog-
nition. But when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this de-
mand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations, we face a
puzzle. If they would, their offense reﬂects a deliberative mistake, and blame’s
hostility seems unnecessary. If they wouldn’t, addressing them is futile, and blame’s
emotional engagement seems unwarranted. To resolve this puzzle, I develop an
account of blame as a proleptic response to indeterminacy in its target’s reasons,
yielding attractive accounts of blame’s relation both to internal reasons claims
and to free will.
Sometimes blame is as simple as attributing a bad outcome to amore gen-
eral defect. I can blame the failure of the picnic on the weather, our mis-
understanding on my poor hearing. However, moral psychologists have
increasingly been drawn to the idea that a deeper and more interesting
kind of blame—the kind of blame essentially directed at responsible
agents, or paradigmatically expressed in attitudes like resentment—is
in some sense communicative, or (as I will put it) addressed. Here blame
expresses a “demand for reasonable regard,” as GaryWatson writes, “a de-
mand addressed to a moral agent, to one who is capable of understand-
ing the demand.”1
* Thanks to Sarah Buss for particularly patient and thoughtful editing, and to the
anonymous reviewers and editors at Ethics for very helpful feedback. This article has also
been much improved by feedback from audiences at job talks and dissertation workshops
in the years since I began it, and by comments from Rachel Achs, Sandy Diehl, Noel Do-
minguez, Susan Rodriguez, Chelsea Rosenthal, Tim Scanlon, Jeff Seidman, Larisa Svirsky,
Vida Yao, and especially Selim Berker and Susan Wolf.
1. Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian
Theme,” inResponsibility, Character, and the Emotions: Essays inMoral Psychology, ed. Ferdinand
Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 256–86, 264. For an insightful
discussion of the versions of this proposal in the existing literature, see ColeenMacnamara,
“Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90
(2015): 546–69.
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There are a number of reasons why this idea is attractive. For one, it
opens the way for blame to serve a distinctive ethical function as a device
for establishing and sustaining shared ethical understanding, rather than
merely being an expression of retributive or retaliatory attitudes we would
be better off without. For another, it promises a satisfying account of how
blame can recognize a form of responsible agency—the capacity to under-
stand and respond to normative demands—that is both characteristic of
persons and intuitively important, and yet plausibly compatible with deter-
minism. And consonantly with both of these considerations, it captures
the importance we place on being blamed. When people we care about
do not resent us after we wrong them, when they instead respond with
gentle guidance or resigned acceptance, we tend to feel shut out or de-
valued, as though they did not respect us enough to address their de-
mands to us.
However, there are also a number of reasons why the idea of ad-
dressed blame is puzzling. We often resent people when we know they will
not or could not recognize and respond to our demands; more glaringly,
blame is hostile in a way that other “incipient forms of communication”
are not.2 If this element of hostility is not justiﬁed in terms of blame’s
communicative role, how could it be justiﬁed at all, except by appeal to
the problematic retributivism that the notion of address was supposed
to help us avoid?
In short, the problem is to show how addressed blame can be justiﬁed
without making the “blame” part incidental. In order to bring the problem
into better focus, I’ll begin by setting out a dilemma, which arises when we
consider what I propose as addressed blame’s distinctive elements of emo-
tional engagement and hostility in relation to its target’s attitudes. We can
ask, is the offender what Bernard Williams called a “hard case,” such that
their attitudes do not support a “sound deliberative route” to the consider-
ations they are blamed for neglecting?3 Or did the offender have such a
route and not take it, owing to ignorance, procedural irrationality, or a lack
of self-governance? In the ﬁrst case, I argue, addressed blame’s element of
emotional engagement is inappropriate; in the second, its element of hos-
tility is.
So if addressed blame is to be appropriate at all, these can’t be the
only options. To show how they aren’t, I’ll draw on two central but un-
derappreciated ideas from Williams’s practical philosophy. The ﬁrst is
that what someone would—as opposed to could—conclude via sound
deliberation can be indeterminate. This is because someone can have
sound deliberative routes from their existing attitudes to any of a range
2. The phrase is from Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil,” 265.
3. Bernard Williams, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” in Making Sense
of Humanity: And Other Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
35–45.
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of practical conclusions, each assigning different considerations differ-
ent weights. In these cases, the extent to which the considerations a per-
son is blamed for neglecting count as reasons for them, relative to their
subjective values, may be indeterminate in turn. This is important, be-
cause it lets us see Williams’s appeal to blame’s “proleptic mechanism”
in a new light.4
In general, blame is proleptic when the ability of its targets to rec-
ognize and respond to our demands may depend on our blame itself,
and when the nature of our blame reﬂects this fact. While some of blame’s
proleptic mechanisms amount to little more than intimidation or peer
pressure, addressed blame stands in a complex, dynamic, and ambivalent
relation to its target’s reasons. When we proleptically address blame to of-
fenders, we presuppose that they have a sound deliberative route to the
recognition we demand, but we do not presuppose that this is the only
such route open to them. The former gives us reason to actively care about
their recognition; the latter gives us reason to be hostile. We want the peo-
ple we blame to be confronted with the considerations they’ve neglected
as forcefully and vividly as possible, in the hope that they might be moved
to accept them. But we are also ready to oppose these people should they
ultimately refuse to do so.
This result has two important implications. First, it yields a broader
understanding of rational appeal. It shows how claims about reasons can
be constrained by the agent’s attitudes—as opposed to being invocations
of considerations whose supposed authority need not be accessible to
the agent at all—without merely being predictions about what the agent
would conclude under idealized deliberative conditions. Rather, they can
be invitations, or demands, to deliberate in particular ways. Second, and
not coincidentally, the essential connection between blame and indeter-
minacy may help us understand, and allay, certain deep but obscure
sources of the suspicion that the freedom required for deep moral re-
sponsibility is incompatible with determinism.
I. BLAME, EMOTION, AND ADDRESS
It will help to begin with a paradigm case. The one I will use comes from
a scene in the novel Howards End and requires a bit of background. But
since the ﬁnal act of Howards End is practically a study of blame, this is
actually very convenient. Every major character blames someone at least
once, each in his or her own way; collectively, they remind the philosoph-
ical reader that blame is heterogeneous. It comes in many species, with
different characteristic presuppositions and aims; any theory of blame
insensitive to this point would miss much of what makes the subject in-
teresting. Thus, Helen Schlegel is indignant at her brother-in-law Henry
4. Ibid., 41.
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Wilcox for his injustice toward a penniless clerk and resents her sister
Margaret for tolerating it. Henry, a sensible man of business, responds by
judiciously distancing himself from Helen in light of what he sees as her
entirely improper anger, combined with her still more improper dalliance
with the clerk himself. Of course, Henry blames the clerk too—who for his
part is consumed by remorse—but that blame is old-fashioned retribu-
tivism: a man in his position, Henry judges, “must pay heavily for his mis-
conduct, and be thrashed within an inch of his life.” Even the third Schle-
gel sibling, the icily donnish Tibby, gives himself bad marks when he
betrays his sister’s conﬁdence under pressure: having expected himself
to do otherwise, he is “deeply vexed, not only for the harm he had done
Helen, but for the ﬂaw he had discovered in his own equipment.”5
But Margaret’s blame is special. It occurs when Henry refuses her a
small but very important request: to allow the sisters to spend Helen’s
last night in England together, in his ﬁrst wife’s beloved ancestral cot-
tage. This is not only heartless but also hypocritical of him: he had him-
self been unfaithful to the past Mrs. Wilcox (as it happens, with the woman
who went on to marry Helen’s clerk). Yet when Margaret begins to raise
that point, Henry’s reaction is insulting:
“You have not been yourself all day,” said Henry, and rose from his
seat with face unmoved. Margaret rushed at him and seized both his
hands. She was transﬁgured.
“Not any more of this!” she cried. “You shall see the connection if
it kills you, Henry! You have had a mistress—I forgave you. My sister
has a lover—you drive her from the house. Do you see the connec-
tion? Stupid, hypocritical, cruel—oh, contemptible!—a man who
insults his wife when she’s alive and cants with her memory when
she’s dead. A man who ruins a woman for pleasure, and casts her
off to ruin other men. And gives bad ﬁnancial advice, and then says
he is not responsible. Thesemen are you. You can’t recognize them,
because you cannot connect. I’ve had enough of your unweeded
kindness. I’ve spoiled you long enough. All your life you have been
spoiled. Mrs. Wilcox spoiled you. No one has ever told you what you
are—muddled, criminally muddled. Men like you use repentance
as a blind, so don’t repent. Only say to yourself: ‘What Helen has
done, I’ve done.’”
“The two cases are different,” Henry stammered. His real retort
was not quite ready. His brain was still in a whirl, and he wanted a
little longer.
“In what way different? You have betrayed Mrs. Wilcox, Henry,
Helen only herself. You remain in society, Helen can’t. You have
had only pleasure; she may die. You have the insolence to talk to
me of differences, Henry?”
5. E. M. Forster,Howards End, ed. Paul Armstrong (New York: Norton, 1998), 217, 221.
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Oh, the uselessness of it! Henry’s retort came.
“I perceive you are attempting blackmail. It is scarcely a pretty
weapon for a wife to use against her husband. My rule through life
has been never to pay the least attention to threats, and I can only
repeat what I said before: I do not give you and your sister leave to
sleep at Howards End.”
Margaret loosed his hands. He went into the house, wiping ﬁrst
one and then the other on his handkerchief. For a little she stood
looking at the Six Hills, tombs of warriors, breasts of the spring. Then
she passed out into what was now the evening.6
One of the most notable things about this scene is how different
Margaret’s blame at the beginning is from her blame at the end. The lat-
ter is cold rejection. It is a perfect example of blame as conceived by
T. M. Scanlon: the revision in one’s intentions and expectations toward
a person warranted when they reveal attitudes that impair the relation-
ships one has or could have to them.7 Margaret lets go of Henry’s hands;
when she next sees him, it is to return his keys and announce her inten-
tion to leave him. His offense has revealed attitudes of his, she concludes,
that make it impossible for her to love him as a husband. But when Mar-
garet reaches this conclusion, she has stopped being angry. This suggests,
as Scanlon’s critics have insisted, that angry or emotional blame is appro-
priate under different conditions from its more detached counterparts
and plays a different role.8 Much of this difference, I suggest, consists in
how Margaret’s anger is addressed to Henry in a way her ﬁnal rejection
is not.
As I will understand it, addressed blame is a particular mode of con-
cern. When you address blame to a person, you care in a particular way
about that person’s recognition of the considerations the offender is
blamed for neglecting as suitably weighty reasons.9 Like any other mode
of concern, this entails characteristic patterns of attention, emotion, and
6. Ibid., 219.
7. T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2008), chap. 4.
8. See, e.g., Michelle Mason, “Blame: Taking it Seriously,” Philosophy and Phenomenolog-
ical Research 83 (2011): 473–81; Susan Wolf, “Blame, Italian Style,” in Reasons and Recogni-
tion: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel
Freeman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 332–47; R. Jay Wallace, “Dispassionate
Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments,” in Reasons and Recognition, 348–72.
All three self-consciously follow P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Freedom and
Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), 1–25.
9. For simplicity, I will mainly discuss blame for actions. However, this formulation of
addressed blame (along with the puzzle it generates) extends to omissions, desires, and
any other attitude that is responsive to normative assessment from the perspective of the
agent’s subjective values. Notably, this does not include beliefs, which seems to me to mark
a deep asymmetry between practical and epistemic normativity.
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motivation, though the nature of these responses depends on the rela-
tion between the blamer, the offense, and the addressee. Blame can be
addressed by victims of a putative offense or, vicariously, by others; it
can be addressed to offenders, to third parties, or (perhaps) to oneself
alone.10 In the last of these cases, blame may not involve more than a
sense of self-assertion or deﬁance; in the second, it generally involves
feelings of outrage. (Here the thought is something like, “Can you see what
they did? Such effrontery must not be tolerated!”) Blame addressed to
offenders, however, is essentially confrontational. It consists in an active,
emotionally vulnerable concern that the offender be presented with the
considerations they are blamed for neglecting in a form they are in a po-
sition to appreciate—a concern to “get in [their] face,” as Susan Wolf
puts it, a concern for them “to see your anger and to feel your pain.”11
While I do not think that it is possible to give a full analysis of this con-
cern prior to an account of when and why it is appropriate, cases like
Margaret’s illustrate what I assume are some of its basic essential fea-
tures: in addressing blame to an offender, you are disposed to be specially
interested in and attentive to their attitudes with respect to the offense, to
be pained not only by the offense itself but also by the offender’s contin-
ued failure suitably to regret it, and to be motivated to bring about this
regret by expressing your blame to them.
It is thus part of the nature of addressed blame that the failure effec-
tively to express it is frustrating. However, the two should not be confused.
I want to allow that it can make sense to address blame to a person when
you do not or could not have sufﬁcient reason to express it to them—for
instance, if the costs of expressing blame outweigh the beneﬁts, or if the
addressee is distant or dead. Though the person’s recognition may be un-
available, you may still have reason to care about it. (This may be why
blame of the dead can be so burdensome and involve nagging tendencies
to fantasize about confronting the person or obsess about what their con-
duct might have meant.) Conversely, when you cease caring about an of-
fender’s recognition, you normally also cease addressing blame to them.
As such, I will assume that addressed blame is appropriate (or “ﬁtting”)
only if you actually have reason to care about its addressee’s recognition,
just as fear is appropriate only if you actually have reason to care about
what the thing you’re afraid of endangers.
10. Taken together, the varieties of addressed blame seem to me at least roughly co-
extensive with the Strawsonian reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation, which
raises the question how, if at all, guilt ﬁts into the framework. While I do not think that
the answer is obvious, the idea that guilt involves parallel attitudes strikes me as promising.
In particular, insofar as guilt normally includes a desire to apologize or atone, it may consist
in a concern to provide, and be recognized reciprocally by the victim as providing, the rec-
ognition at which addressed blame aims.
11. Wolf, “Blame, Italian Style,” 338; emphasis in the original.
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This is the key difference between addressed blame and other
forms. When Margaret ﬁnally rejects Henry, she does so because she
takes his conduct to reveal facts about his attitudes that give her reason
no longer to care about his recognition. It would be different if, after
loosing Henry’s hands and passing out into the evening, Margaret con-
tinued to stew about what happened and silently resent him. That would
suggest that she continued to address her blame to Henry while judging
that it would be pointless to express it. But she doesn’t. She is bitterly dis-
appointed, but she moves on. Were she less materially independent and
self-assured, her resentment might still call out to others for protection
or conﬁrmation; as it stands, there is nothing for it but to withdraw.
Inmy view,Margaret’s reaction reﬂects a general condition on blame:
it is appropriately addressed only to offenders whose attitudes give them a
potential basis for appreciating the considerations at issue, via what Wil-
liams called a “sound deliberative route.” This leads to the problem I want
to explore. It can be natural to think that there is always a fact of thematter
as to what someone would conclude via sound deliberation, so that if it’s
not the case that youwouldn’t appreciate certain considerations were you
to soundly deliberate from your existing attitudes, it must be the case that
you would. But this would limit blame to cases of deliberative failure—
like ignorance, confusion, or weakness of will—and this is implausible:
Margaret’s anger, at least, certainly doesn’t seem to rest on the presuppo-
sition that some such factor is at work. So if we takeMargaret’s case at face
value—and in the next sections, I’ll argue that we should—it follows that
blame addressed to offenders can only be appropriate if there’s another
option.
II. WHY BLAME IS INAPPROPRIATELY ADDRESSED
TO HARD CASES
Let me ﬁrst deﬁne some terms. Notoriously, Williams held that all of our
reasons for action were constrained by, or “internal” to, our attitudes,
such that “[an agent] A has a reason to J only if there is a sound deliber-
ative route from A‘s subjective motivational set . . . to A‘s J-ing.”12 I will not
assume this view here, however. While I am happy to allow that some or
all genuine normative reasons may be external, this would not make
blame less puzzling. Blame is puzzling because a natural conception of
how an agent’s failure to give weight to certain considerations may or
may not reﬂect their underlying evaluative commitments seems to imply
12. Bernard Williams, “Postscript: Some Further Notes on Internal and External Rea-
sons,” in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2001), 91–97, 91; emphasis in the original.
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that it can’t appropriately be addressed to its targets. Whether or not
these considerations correspond to external reasons is irrelevant.
To this end, it will be convenient to use “sound deliberative route”
to refer to the way an agent’s attitudes, suitably idealized, determine the
contents of their underlying evaluative commitments (or, for short, “val-
ues”), and to understand “internal reasons” as the considerations that
count as normative relative to them. Thus, extending Williams’s formu-
lation, we can say that a consideration (determinately) counts as an in-
ternal reason of a given weight for you just in case you have a sound de-
liberative route from your existing attitudes (only) to assigning it that
weight in practical reasoning and evaluation.13 (Since these are the only
reasons I will be talking about, I will often leave the “internal” part im-
plicit. Readers who object to calling internal reasons “reasons” are free
to substitute another phrase.)
Importantly, Williams himself stressed that the concept of a sound
deliberative route was meant to be very permissive and open-ended. As
he understood it, sound deliberation includes the correction of logical
errors and the addition of relevant information—if what you think is a
chocolate chip cookie is actually full of raisins, you might be motivated
to eat it but not have reason to—but it is not limited to this. To begin
with, it can also involve things like exercises of imagination and critical
reﬂection: you might have reason to take up bird-watching despite being
totally unmotivated to, if you would see it as worthwhile were you more
attentive to what it would involve and how it would complement your
other interests. Somewhat more tendentiously, I will further assume that
sound deliberation includes effective regulation by attitudes that (as var-
ious philosophers have put it) have “agential authority,” or embody your
“real self” or “practical identity.”14 These are the attitudes on whose basis
people reason and act insofar as their conduct is fully representative of
them and they are fully in control of it. For example, if you are a raisin
cookie addict, no amount of informed, systematic, and imaginative de-
liberation may sufﬁce for you to give them up and eat chocolate chip
cookies instead. Nevertheless, this may still be what you havemost reason
to do.
13. For the importance of extending the formulation to evaluative attitudes other
than practical conclusions, see n. 9; for an explanation of the parentheticals, see Sec. V.
At the risk of digression, it may be worth adding that I think that the weights of internal
reasons are best understood broadly on the model of intention, in terms of plans or pol-
icies for deliberation and evaluation. For a sophisticated and plausible account, see Mi-
chael Bratman, Structures of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
14. See, respectively, Bratman, Structures of Agency; Gary Watson, “Two Faces of Re-
sponsibility,” Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 227–48; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of
Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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Now, these assumptions still only leave us with a vague conception
of sound deliberation to go on.15 But this is all we need. We only need to
say that if someone is a hard case, the conclusion that they did not give
enough weight to the considerations they are blamed for neglecting is
not something they can be reasoned into, in any credible sense of the
phrase. Expressing blame to them might get them to “consider matters
aright,” but only in the sense that hitting them on the head or giving
them a pill could—as a form of brute causal manipulation, rather than
interpersonal engagement.16
When we address blame to offenders, however, we see their conduct
as calling speciﬁcally for interpersonal engagement. Margaret does not
want to correct Henry; she wants to confront him. And even if she did
want to correct him—even if she saw his offense as somehow giving her
reason to take the burden of hismoral education (or rather reeducation)
upon herself—this in itself would not give her reason to react emotionally
to him in the way I have claimed to be characteristic of addressed blame.
It would not give her reason to want to express her blame to him as he is
now, to view his present attitudes as worthy of special interest and atten-
tion, to experience his ongoing failure to regret his conduct as a source of
pain. At most, it could give her reason to change him into someone with
whom she could engage, and to express her blame—if at all—as a kind of
pretense calculated toward accomplishing this.17
What reason could there be to address blame to a hard case, rather
than respondwith disappointment and rejection? Philosophical defenses
of angry or emotional blame typically cast it as an expression of self-
respect, or a healthy concern formorality (or, less narrowly, for the norms
transgressed).18 These things seem to me to support excellent explana-
15. As Williams recognized, this leaves open the possibility that sound deliberation
could be somehow such that everyone’s internal reasons signiﬁcantly converge, so that,
for instance, everyone might have conclusive internal reason to be moral. Many internal
reasons theorists go to great lengths to defend this claim. Williams cited Christine Kors-
gaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 5–25; she has
been followed by Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1994); and
Julia Markovits, Moral Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), among others. De-
spite the focus of my discussion, I am happy to grant the possibility—provided that it is
granted in exchange that it should make a difference to blame. As its religious defenders
themselves tend to insist, if wrongdoers are never hard cases, we should blame them more
gently: their offenses may warrant sadness, pity, or a willingness to offer guidance, but not
hostility.
16. Compare John McDowell, “Might There Be External Reasons,” inMind, Value and
Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 95–111, 101. Thanks to an editor
at Ethics for pressing me to address this possibility.
17. That is, in the same manner as what Margaret Little calls our “proleptic engage-
ment” with small children. See Margaret Little, “Abortion and the Margins of Person-
hood,” Rutgers Law Journal 39 (2008): 331–48, 342.
18. Here Wallace is representative; see Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” 368.
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tions of blame addressed to third parties or to oneself, but not blame ad-
dressed speciﬁcally to offenders. It is possible to be outraged by a show of
disrespect without being personally hurt by it, and to express one’s blame
to an offender purely as an act of deﬁance rather than communication.
There is a difference, as it were, between resentment and ressentiment. A
healthy concern for a set of norms, or for your status with respect to them,
may give you reason to seek reassurance from others—or at least others
you respect—that contra some offender they accept these norms as well;
as part of this, it may also give you reason to want the offense to be pub-
licly repudiated or the offender shamed.19 Correspondingly, self-respect
may require you to forcefully confront an offender, but—following Ber-
nard Boxill—this expression of protest may not be grounded in a con-
cern for the offender’s recognition so much as a need to conﬁrm to one-
self one’s faith in it.20
Given the naturalness of these alternatives, what would it say about a
person if he continued to address his blame to a known hard case, de-
spite the manifest futility of doing so? Again, remember the patterns
of attention, emotion, and motivation this would involve: it would mean
continuing to attend to attitudes that could only embody indifference or
opposition to you and your values, to be pained by the absence of a rec-
ognition that cannot be forthcoming, and to hold motivations that can
only be frustrated. Taken together, these not only allow the harm inﬂicted
by an offense to fester but also give the offender a kind of power. To en-
dorse these attitudes as appropriate would be to submit to this power. It
would be to treat the constitutional offensiveness of the agent’s values as
entitling them to it, in virtue of calling for engagement that persists regard-
less of its one-sidedness. I fail to see why anyone with a healthy conﬁdence
in his or her own values would do this.
19. Compare Margaret Urban Walker, “Resentment and Assurance,” in Setting the
Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers, ed. Cheshire Calhoun (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2004), 145–60, in which she proposes that resentment implicitly calls out for “as-
surance of protection, defense, or membership under norms brought in question by the exciting
injury or affront” (156–57; emphasis in the original) but stresses that this need not and of-
ten should not be sought from offenders themselves.
20. Bernard Boxill, “Self-Respect and Protest,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1976):
58–69. Interestingly, Margaret herself later afﬁrms her blame along similar lines. “Her
speech to [Henry] seemed perfect,” Forster writes; “She would not have altered a word.
It had to be uttered once in a life, to adjust the lopsidedness of the world. It was spoken
not only to her husband, but to thousands of men like him—a protest against the inner
darkness in high places that comes with a commercial age” (Howards End, 235). Neverthe-
less, the reader inclined to interpret Margaret’s speech primarily as a general expression of
protest should consider that it was hardly spoken to Henry in the same way that it was spo-
ken to the thousands of men like him. It may have been a protest, but it was also a last des-
perate attempt to connect, and it could have been the ﬁrst without having been the second.
This illustrates the important point that blame can be addressed in multiple directions at
once, in ways that need not be transparent to the subject.
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In this respect, to care about a hard case’s recognition would be
disempowering, if not demeaning. I take this to be the most basic reason
why blame addressed to hard cases is as such inappropriate, in a way un-
derscored by the possibility of contempt. Contempt can embody a dis-
tinctive form of blame, one that represents its target precisely as someone
whose conduct it would be demeaning to take personally. And it seems to
bemade appropriate, at least in a broad class of cases, precisely by the fact
that the offender is a hard case. In her analysis of the emotion, Michelle
Mason thus describes the playwright Paul and his wife Camille, “charac-
ters in a ﬁlm by Jean-Luc Goddard titled, conveniently for my purposes,
Le mépris.”21 Paul is contemptible to Camille not only because he insult-
ingly encourages her to accept the advances of a caddish American pro-
ducer (thereby selling out what had been a happy marriage for career ad-
vancement) but also because while he does so he is “perplexed by his
inability to comprehend what, if anything, he has done wrong.”22 Paul’s
incomprehension doesn’t excuse his conduct, but it does make contin-
ued emotional engagement inappropriate. Why should Camille concern
herself with a perspective fundamentally insensitive to her dignity? This
explains her contempt: through its lens, whatmakes Paul unworthy of ad-
dress makes him worthy of a yet more severe form of blame.23
III. WHY BLAME CAN’T ONLY BE ADDRESSED AS A RESPONSE
TO DELIBERATIVE FAILURE
We can now turn to the second horn. In addition to the patterns of at-
tention, emotion, and motivation I have discussed so far, blame ad-
dressed to offenders is hostile. This is what distinguishes it from mere
distress at someone’s insensitivity coupled with concern to see it corrected.
But if such blame were only appropriate on condition that the offender
21. Michelle Mason, “Contempt as a Moral Attitude,” Ethics 113 (2003): 234–72, 236. I
follow Mason’s portrayal of these characters, which she admits is less morally ambiguous
than their portrayal in the ﬁlm.
22. Ibid., 250 n. 38. Mason makes this observation while distinguishing contempt
from resentment, which is undermined by ignorance to a greater extent; though she does
not go so far as to argue this, I conjecture that contempt characteristically represents its
objects as hard cases. For one thing, this would explain—as Mason’s original analysis leaves
obscure—why contempt tends to limit resentment. For another, it may account for the
widespread Kantian belief that contempt is never justiﬁed, since on many reconstructions
of Kant’s practical philosophy, its appropriate objects are nonexistent. (See also n. 15.)
23. Much the same applies to other hard cases discussed in moral philosophy. Thus,
Gary Watson notes that while the heartlessness of the murderer Robert Harris “makes him
utterly unsuitable as a moral interlocutor, [it] intensiﬁes rather than inhibits the reactive
attitudes” (“Responsibility and the Limits of Evil,” 271). But which ones? Watson mentions
“moral outrage,” but this may well be addressed to others; in the newspaper article he ex-
cerpts, Harris’s fellow inmates seem mainly to respond with rejection or disgust. (“You
don’t want to deal with him out there, we don’t want to deal with him in here,” says one.)
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would recognize the relevant considerations were they to soundly delib-
erate, its element of hostility would be mysterious. In that case, address-
ing blame to someone would entail seeing them as someone whose rec-
ognition could be secured simply by informing them of relevant facts or
helping them get into better control of themselves. Apart from a special
case I’ll discuss in the next section—which turns out to be the exception
that proves the rule—neither of these things is essentially hostile.
This point is underscored by the fact that viewing addressed blame
predominantly as a response to deliberative failure would seem to get its
emphasis backward. It would imply that the paradigm cases, where blame
should be at its strongest and steadiest, are those in which it’s clearest
that an offense reﬂects bad deliberation rather than bad values. But this
is not so. P. F. Strawson observed that the strength of resentment and in-
dignation “is in general proportioned to what is felt to be the magnitude
of the injury and to the degree to which the agent’s will is identiﬁed with,
or indifferent to, it.”24 While this claim needs to be qualiﬁed when it
comes to hard cases, there is clearly something to it. If you break a signif-
icant promise to a friend when you’re clearly just upset or exhausted,
your offense may be relatively easy to write off. But if you do it deliber-
ately, in a manner that really calls your commitment to the friendship
into question, your friend’s blame would presumably not become more
tentative and less passionate. And while we do sometimes address blame
to offenders whose conduct we know to result from deliberative failures,
this is generally because we take these failures to raise questions of their
own. If the people we blame really cared, we wonder, shouldn’t they have
been more thoughtful, or tried harder to keep control of themselves?
But then the dilemma recurs. If an offender lacks a sound deliberative
route to suitably regretting their failure—if they’re a higher-order hard
case, as it were, for whom being informed or reﬂective or resolute just
wasn’t worth the bother—then our blame for both it and the offense it
led to appropriately cools into distrust or contempt. On the other hand,
if the offender didn’t prevent their deliberative failure only because of
yet another deliberative failure at a still higher level, we face an obvious
regress.25
This argument might be resisted by claiming that addressed blame’s
element of hostility is grounded in something other than a concern for the
24. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 21.
25. This regress parallels the one Gideon Rosen defends in “Skepticism about Moral
Responsibility,” Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004): 295–313, though the differences be-
tween them are instructive. Rosen argues that blame is appropriate only when an offender
is, effectively, a higher-order hard case—i.e., if their offense ultimately derives a fully in-
formed (and presumably agentially authoritative) refusal to respond to objective reasons;
I argue that blame addressed to the offender is not appropriate even then. However, I see
no reason why other kinds should be subject to this kind of regress at all.
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offender’s recognition. The problem is that it is notoriously obscure what
that other thing could be.26Whilemany kinds of negative reaction are both
justiﬁed and understandable in response to deliberative failure—disap-
pointment, frustration, a demand for redress—the hostility characteristic
of Margaret’s anger plainly transcends these. This can make it natural to
hold—asmany people have—that no substantive explanation is necessary;
rather, blame’s hostility is simply seen as deserved, as a matter of basic nor-
mative fact.27 Now, I think that this view is seriously confused, and I’ll ex-
plain why below. But at this point I will simply note that it plainly does
not apply to Margaret. If the hostility characteristic of her anger were
grounded in a concern that Henry get what he deserve, his recalcitrance
should only have intensiﬁed it. People who seem to believe in desert tend
to judge hardened wrongdoers more harshly than ambivalent ones: insofar
as a decisive commitment to offensive values would make a difference to
desert at all, it presumably wouldmake the agentmore deserving, not less.
IV. VARIETIES OF PROLEPTIC BLAME
Taken together, the arguments above demonstrate two of what Williams
called “the ways in which the presence of deliberative reasons, or, again,
the appropriateness of focussed blame, fall off in one or another direc-
tion.”28 In the ﬁrst case, what falls off is the appropriateness of concern;
in the second, the appropriateness of hostility. In order for these elements
of blame to be jointly intelligible, there must be offenders who are neither
hard cases nor, straightforwardly, victims of deliberative failure.
I say “straightforwardly” here because some cruder kinds of prolep-
tic blame are a special case. As I said in the introduction, blame is pro-
leptic when it reﬂects the fact that the existence or content of the agent’s
reasons against offending may depend on the blame itself. Often, there
is nothing especially complicated about this: a lot of blame works prolep-
tically simply because people have an interest in avoiding it.
To take my favorite example: in The Big Lebowski, Walter Sobchak de-
stroys a car with the express purpose of showing a teenage antagonist
“what happens when you [treat] a stranger [unjustly].” Walter isn’t espe-
cially interested in moral education here: he just can’t stand that some-
one should see him to be taken advantage of. After the kid (whose name
is Larry) stonily ignores his reprimands, he turns to Plan B: this, at least,
will make Larry understand that stealing from him and his friend was
26. This problem looms large in discussions of moral responsibility; for a sharp recent
statement of it, see David Goldman, “Modiﬁcation of the Reactive Attitudes,” Paciﬁc Philo-
sophical Quarterly 95 (2014): 1–22.
27. See, e.g., Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
28. Williams, “Internal Reasons,” 43.
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a bad idea. Like most people, Walter sees himself as holding certain
claims—for him, speciﬁed inter alia by the rules of bowling, the First
Amendment, and the laws of the Sabbath—and wants others to see these
claims as worth respecting. However, he is not especially concerned with
the nature of their reasons for doing so. Even if they do not respect the
authority of the claims as such, they might still respect them out of fear
of him. His disposition to blame helps ensure this. Thus, when he de-
stroys the car, he indeed presupposes that Larry made a deliberative fail-
ure—if Larry were fully sensitive to what the consequences of his theft
would be like, he would not have committed it. ButWalter recognizes that
the truth of this presupposition may depend on the very fact that the per-
ceived offense wouldmotivate him to react as he did. (“You see what hap-
pens, Larry! You see what happens?! This is what happens when you
[treat] a stranger [unjustly]! Here’s what happens, Larry!”) For this rea-
son, Walter’s blame could not have fulﬁlled its aim if being the target of
its expression were not itself undesirable, in ways that go beyond any re-
morse it may or may not prompt. Far from being otiose, its hostility is es-
sential to its function.
Walter’s blame is notable in two respects. First, it helps explain why
angry reactive attitudes are often interpreted as retributive—a point I’ll
return to at the end. Second, it illustrates a basic problem that applies
(only slightly less obviously) to the proleptic mechanism that Williams
emphasizes most. Observing that much blame appeals to “the ethically
important disposition that consists in a desire to be respected by people
whom, in turn, one respects,” Williams writes,
In [circumstances where this disposition is operative], blame con-
sists of, as it were, a proleptic invocation of a reason to do or not
do a certain thing, which applies in virtue of a disposition to have
the respect of other people. To blame someone in this way is, roughly,
to tell him he had a reason to act otherwise, and in a direct sense
this may not have been true. Yet in a way it has now become true, in
virtue of his having a disposition to do things that people he respects
expect of him, and in virtue of this recognition, which it is hoped
that the blame will bring to him, of what those people expect.29
ThoughWilliams commended this disposition as a “deeper form [of mo-
tivation] than merely the desire to avoid hostility,” both dispositions sup-
port fundamentally similar kinds of blame. If you value being the sort of
person the varsity quarterback would esteem, you have reason not to do
anything he would disapprove of. If you fear Walter’s wrath, you likewise
have reason not to do anything that would provoke it. In both cases, your
reason depends on an interest in avoiding blame as such. It does not de-
29. Ibid., 41–42.
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pend on whether you can see the other person’s expectations of you as
independently justiﬁable.
Margaret’s blame is different. “Men like you use repentance as a
blind,” she tells Henry, “so don’t repent.” What she means is not that
she doesn’t want his repentance at all, but that she doesn’t want it
per se. She would only want it if it were based on the considerations she
herself took to count against Henry’s conduct, namely, that it was unfair
and inhumane. If it were only based on a desire for domestic tranquility,
it would be worthless. Nor is her attitude unreasonable. When people re-
spond to our blame by saying things like “I didn’t mean to offend you; I’m
so sorry,” or “if I knew it bothered you so much, I wouldn’t have done it,” we
tend to feel insulted. This is because these people imply that our reasons
for feeling offended are beside the point. Even if they are expressing the
desire to conform to the expectations of others which Williams com-
mended, they may not want to conform to our expectations because they
think they are justiﬁed. They may just want to out of peer pressure, the
way one might make sure to wear school colors on a game day because
the varsity quarterback’s imagined disappointment ﬁlls one with shame.30
In this case, they would not recognize us as ethical co-deliberators of fun-
damentally equal standing, such that each aims to hold the other only to
intersubjectively justiﬁable expectations.31
Thus, while Walter’s and the imagined quarterback’s blame both re-
semble Margaret’s in seeking a kind of recognition from the offender,
the recognition they aim at is shallower. To mark this difference, I’ll call
their kind of blame punitive blame, reserving “addressed blame” for Mar-
garet’s kind. This terminology registers the point that the full extent of
addressed blame’s ethical importance depends on its function as a form
of speciﬁcally rational address—on the fact that it aims, again, at offend-
ers recognizing speciﬁcally the considerations justifying our expecta-
tions from our own perspective. This importance is illustrated by the fact
that merely punitive blame is intelligible when offenders cannot under-
stand the considerations we take to justify our expectations of them, or
when they would reject our expectations if they did understand the con-
siderations, or when our expectations are so arbitrary that there is no
question of their justiﬁcation even for us. Addressed blame proper is in-
telligible in none of these cases.
30. This objection comes from Pamela Hieronymi’s “Internal Reasons and the Integ-
rity of Blame,” 8–9, which she makes available in the “neither published nor in progress”
section of her academic website; see http://hieronymi.bol.ucla.edu/Neither_Nor_ﬁles
/Williams_article_ﬁnal.pdf.
31. Here I echo Stephen Darwall’s distinction between (moralized) resentment and
the retaliatory or shaming responses to insult he associates with honor cultures. See Ste-
phen Darwall, “Justice and Retaliation,” in Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-
Personal Ethics II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 50–71.
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When we distinguish addressed blame from its punitive cousin, the
dilemma returns in force. Punitive blame is indeed appropriate in re-
sponse to deliberative failure, but only because the offender’s delibera-
tive failure may have consisted in neglecting their reasons to avoid blame
per se—reasons that punitive blame’s element of hostility aims to pro-
vide. Since addressed blame proper makes no appeal to such reasons,
its element of hostility remains puzzling. Nevertheless, punitive blame
still has something to teach us. Since it avoids the dilemma speciﬁcally
by functioning proleptically, it is natural to wonder whether there is a
way for addressed blame to function proleptically too.32 In the rest of
the article, I will argue that there is, but it requires giving up the assump-
tion that internal reasons are determinate.
V. INDETERMINATE REASONS AND UNDERSPECIFIED VALUES
We can begin by turning to Williams himself, who defended the possibil-
ity and importance of rational indeterminacy throughout his work.33
“Practical reasoning is a heuristic process,” he wrote, “and an imaginative
one”;34 since “it is impossible that it should be fully determinate what
imagination might contribute to deliberation,” this is “one reason why
32. In Miranda Fricker, “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation,”
Noûs 50 (2016): 165–83, Fricker likewise stresses addressed blame’s proleptic mechanism
but conceives it only in terms of a desire to conform to the expectations of others. If offend-
ers “are thus susceptible to your admonitions at this baseline level,” she suggests, “then the
blame communicated may gain some psychological purchase. That is, the latter motive on
their part has the result that your expression of blame affects them somewhat (perhaps
they start to feel a little sorry, or at least question what they have done), so that in some
measure they are brought nearer to recognizing the reason which formerly failed to weigh
with them appropriately” (ibid., 176). But just what kind of psychological inﬂuence is this
proleptic mechanism supposed to exert? If the offender has a sound deliberative route to
recognizing the reasons at issue in the ﬁrst place—and so to regretting their offense inde-
pendently of the desire for esteem per se—then it can at best function as an incentive to
deliberate soundly ( just like a promise of ice cream). On the other hand, if the offender
lacks such a route, then the inﬂuence would be purely causal ( just like a bump on the
head). In neither case would blame prompt the desired recognition qua communication,
or even qua blame.
33. In addition to the passages I quote in the text, see Bernard Williams, “Values, Rea-
sons, and the Theory of Persuasion,” in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, ed. A. W. Moore
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 109–18, 110: “There is no naturalistic rea-
son, based on considerations of psychology or the philosophy of mind, to suppose that in-
determinacies [in an agent’s values] are radically reducible, in particular to preference
orderings that can be handled by Bayesian techniques. If there is a demand for such a reduc-
tion, it is of a normative, rather than an explanatory character, or, perhaps, the kind that is a
fusion of the two, namely a demand that the phenomena should be such that a particular
kind of explanation should be possible.”
34. Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101–13, 110.
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it may be indeterminate what exactly an agent has reason to do.”35
But allowing for indeterminacy, he recognized, is no simple matter. It
makes it harder to formulate conditions for when a reason is “internal”
in the ﬁrst place: “The internalist account is generous with what counts as
a sound deliberative route. It rejects the picture by which a determinate
and ﬁxed set of preferences is expressed simply in terms of its decision-
theoretic rational extensions, and deliberation is construed simply as a
matter of discovering what those are. The difﬁculty is that if, in rejecting
this false picture, we allow any extension whatsoever of the agent’s S to
count, we have lost hold of the notion of what the agent has reason to
do in virtue of his S.”36 Michael Smith puts the problem starkly. Suppose
you are somehow psychologically such that whenever you imagine what
some arbitrary state of affairs would be like (“for there to be exactly
1,346,117 blades of grass on a particular lawn,” Smith offers), you imme-
diately desire that it obtain.37 Surely the fact that you could acquire this
desire as a result of imaginative deliberation from your existing attitudes
does not make it one that, relative to those attitudes, you have any reason
at all to satisfy. But then, what distinguishes this kind of inﬂuence from
the kind imagination can properly exert?
For my purposes, it will be enough to recognize that it can take
imagination to work out what your values are. Many of our values are
vague; Henry’s, in fact, are a good example. It’s conceivable that, prior
to his exchange with Margaret, Henry should have been decisively com-
mitted to values detailed and determinate enough to rule out everything
but what he did. But his initial inarticulacy, the terms of Margaret’s in-
35. Williams, “Internal Reasons,” 38.
36. Williams, “Values, Reasons,” 114–15. Williams’s own proposal is characteristically
inventive but perplexing: it is to “reverse the order of explanation” and appeal, at an ana-
lytically basic level, to the ethics of persuasion. Even when a deliberative conclusion is not
mechanically derivable from an agent’s (relevantly informed) prior motivations, Williams
suggests, it may still count as an expression of one’s internal reasons—rather than a mod-
iﬁcation of them—when it is a conclusion to which the agent could be led through the aid
of a well-informed adviser operating transparently and sympathetically, such that the advice
“is truthful and addresses the question from the adviser’s best understanding of the wants
and interests of the agent,” and “is therefore not manipulative” (ibid., 117). Williams does
not attempt to work out this proposal in detail, however, and I will not take up the task here.
37. Michael Smith, “A Puzzle about Internal Reasons,” in Luck, Value, and Commitment:
Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, ed. Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2012), 195–218, 209. Though he presents his account as a reading of
Williams, Smith does not mention “Values, Reasons, and the Theory of Persuasion” and
seems to have been unaware that Williams considered the puzzle himself. The solution
he proposes on the latter’s behalf—that to desire that a state of affairs obtain is not only
to be motivated to produce it but also to like that it obtains in circumstances in which you
are vividly aware of its obtaining (such that imagination is necessary for discovering which de-
sires whose satisfaction you would like to be vividly aware of)—is notable partly for its rigid
adherence to the deterministic picture of rationality Williams forcefully opposed.
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dictment, and common sense all suggest otherwise. Margaret does not
love him foolishly—he is, in many ways, a thoughtful and humane per-
son. However, he also has what Forster calls his “fortress”—a perspective
deﬁned roughly in terms of values related to dominance, self-sufﬁciency,
and, at best, a vaguely patriarchal sense of honor. As such, he is commit-
ted to a cluster of general principles, ideals, and projects: some related
to authority and tradition, others to his family, others to his humanism.
But like most people, most of his commitments do not have especially
detailed and precise content. They might credibly be interpreted and
weighed against each other in any number of ways, supporting any num-
ber of possible responses to circumstances. What he has internal reason
to do, therefore, depends on how his values are to be speciﬁed.
Here it is useful to compare Henry’s reasons with the way super-
valuationist philosophers of language construe the extensions of vague
predicates, like “bald.”38 “Bald,” they argue, admits of multiple interpre-
tations, or “sharpenings,” each entailing a precise set of necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for when a person is bald. When a claim is true
on each sharpening—like “Jean-Luc Picard is bald”—we can say it’s deter-
minately true, or “supertrue.” When it’s false on each sharpening—like
“James T. Kirk is bald”—we can say it’s determinately false, or “superfalse.”
When it’s true on some and false on others—like “Joe Biden is bald”—we
can say that its truth value is indeterminate. As extensions are to sharp-
enings of predicates, so internal reasons are to speciﬁcations of values.
Thus, a consideration determinately counts as an internal reason of a cer-
tain weight for you if and only if it is to be assigned that weight on every
admissible speciﬁcation of your values.
Now, I take no position on the truth of supervaluationism. Perhaps
for every predicate there is a uniquely correct sharpening, and the expe-
rience of vagueness is the experience of ignorance. Be that as it may, the
corresponding position in the practical case strikes me as clearly false.
Not all candidate speciﬁcations are admissible, of course. As Henry S.
Richardson has argued, speciﬁcatory reasoning is indeed a formof reason-
ing. As such, it is characteristically governed by certain norms.39 Leaving
the details of these norms open, I assume that some candidate speciﬁca-
tions of a given value are properly ruled out as introducing unsupported
expansions or irrelevant qualiﬁcations, or properly preferred over others
according to certain formal criteria, like coherence (hence the intuitive
unacceptability of Smith’s blades-of-grass desire, which would not be sup-
ported by an admissible speciﬁcation of any realistic set of values). But in
order for it always to be determinate what you have internal reason to do,
38. See, e.g., Kit Fine, “Vagueness, Truth, and Logic,” Synthese 30 (1975): 265–300.
39. See Henry S. Richardson, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1994).
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these criteria would have to be demanding enough to exclude all but one
speciﬁcation (or set of mutually consistent ones) for every initial set of val-
ues. And I can’t imagine any criteria so demanding that they would neces-
sarily pertain to realistic agents like Henry Wilcox.
This raises the question how agents with vague values decide what to
do. What would their ideal deliberation look like? At a certain level of
abstraction—on which it is viewed analogously to planning a road trip
between a given pair of cities or choosing between blueprints for ﬁnish-
ing a house—it can look very strange. Are ideal deliberators to begin by
representing their initial, partially speciﬁed values to themselves as fully
as possible, then compare every candidate speciﬁcation according to the
relevant formal criteria, and—in the event that those criteria fail to de-
termine a winner—ﬁnally select randomly among the remaining op-
tions, as if by ﬂipping coins? When we act from vague values, we gener-
ally suppose ourselves to act authentically. If we are not mistakenly to
believe there to be more truth about our reasons than there is, we must
in some way specify our values as we go. But how? We certainly do not
feel ourselves to be picking even implicitly between candidate speciﬁca-
tions at random.
In fact, there’s no reason to think that to act in accord with our stron-
gest reasons, we must ﬁrst specify our values at all. Often, practical reason-
ing goes in the opposite direction. We simply ﬁnd ourselves responding to
concrete situations in particular ways, and we specify our values only incre-
mentally and in retrospect, in order to make sense of our conduct as em-
bodying them.Moreprecisely, we treat the responseswe are actuallymoved
tomake inparticular cases as default constraints on the speciﬁcationof our
ends. That is, if you are pursuing a vague end and ﬁnd yourself moved to
respond to a particular situation in a way that would count as appropriate
on at least one speciﬁcation of that end, youmayperfectly sensibly proceed
on the presumption that it is appropriate—such that any admissible spec-
iﬁcation of your end will have to account for that response as appropriate
relative to it. As you repeat this process over multiple occasions, the set of
responses to which you’re committed increases, and the set of coherent
speciﬁcations that can accommodate all of them narrows proportionately.
The result is that your ends become increasingly determinate as you try to
make sense of your activity in light of them.40
One example of this process might be improvisation in music or
painting, where you might start with a very vague sense of what you want
to express and clarify it as you go.41 Here, treating your responses as de-
40. This supports Williams’s suggestive discussion of akrasia in Bernard Williams,
Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 44–46, in which he
holds that whether an action is akratic may be only determinate retrospectively.
41. Compare Benjamin Bagley, “Loving Someone in Particular,” Ethics 125 (2015):
477–507.
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fault constraints in specifying your end means treating the ways you’re
spontaneously moved to paint or play as partial expressions of some larger
idea or theme, which you deﬁne by progressively ﬁtting your responses
into a coherent whole. Another example is Henry. The concernsMargaret
expresses in her anger immediately repulse him—he experiences them
as things to be rejected, as somehow illegitimate—but his initial attitude
is inchoate. (“His real retort was not quite ready. His brain was still in a
whirl, and he wanted a little longer.”) Again, there is no reason to think
that his inarticulacy is just epistemic—that there’s some underlying fact
of the matter about how he should respond, relative to his values, and he
just doesn’t know it yet. Crucially—for my argument and, I think, for
Forster’s narrative—it is very easy to imagine how things might have
gone differently. In a nearby possible world (Howards End as rewritten
by Iris Murdoch, maybe) some fortuitous causal factor might have al-
lowed Margaret to break through Henry’s reserve (the evening light
might have struck her just so, compelling Henry to really look at his wife
for the ﬁrst time); his ensuing response might have been equally true to
his values as they stood, supported by an equally admissible speciﬁcation
of them.42
Nevertheless, Henry is not ambivalent. He does not regard his actual
reaction as embodying his values only to the same indeterminate extent
that an opposite counterfactual one would be. He regards it as reﬂecting
what he has most reason to do, and he settles on a partial speciﬁcation of
his values that entails this. Thus, Margaret challenges him to identify a
morally relevant difference between her sister’s case and his own, and
at ﬁrst he’s at a loss because he can’t. But he then makes sense of his re-
action by concluding that the comparative moral status of his and Hel-
en’s actions is not the point. The fact remains that Howards End is his
property, and he may permit or refuse guests as he pleases, and Helen’s
42. Interestingly, Forster is careful to show that Henry was feeling combative even be-
fore his exchange with Margaret (he’d just had a tiff with his driver); since the scene takes
place in the early evening, he was probably hungry, too. In the absence of these factors,
Margaret may well have reached him. (Importantly, these factors should not be assumed
to constitute distorting inﬂuences on Henry’s reasons; in certain contexts, many people
can and do reasonably regard such things as liberating.)
Note that such incidental factors recommend caution about counterfactual formula-
tions of internalism. For example, Michael Smith writes that an agent’s internal reasons are
“ﬁxed by what he would desire after correct deliberation, where this is in turn . . . a matter
of what the agent himself desires in the nearest possible world in which his beliefs and de-
sires conform to all the norms of reasons that govern them” (“Puzzle about Internal Rea-
sons,” 198–99). Since there may bemany possible worlds that meet this condition, the near-
est one to an agent at a given time will presumably depend on the agent’s overall causal
makeup. But it’s silly to think that an agent’s internal reasons should shift radically frommo-
ment tomoment, depending on whether the agent has had his dinner yet or on how the eve-
ning light is currently striking the agent’s wife.
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transgression against respectable society would make continued associa-
tion shameful. His own transgression, while embarrassing, was not di-
rectly against Margaret; having been confessed and forgiven, it leaves
his rightful authority as a husband intact. Therefore, Margaret’s effort
to oppose that authority by bringing it up has the normative status of
a blackmail attempt.
Henry’s response is likely to strike the reader as a rationalization.
But rationalization is a form of misrepresentation, and there need be
no independent truth for Henry’s response to misrepresent. To the ex-
tent that it resolves an indeterminacy, it rather constitutes what Williams
called “a creative step in deliberation,”43 representing Henry’s authentic
effort to settle where he stands with respect to his past decision. What
Margaret’s blame does is force him to do this: to commit one way or
the other to the rational status for him not only of his refusal but also
of the perspective on that refusal her blame expresses.
VI. PROPERLY PROLEPTIC BLAME
Williams put his ﬁnger on the relationship between blame and indeter-
minacy when he wrote that “when we say that [someone] ought to have
acted otherwise, we may imply, in such a case, that he did indeed have a
reason to act otherwise; but it would be rash of us to imply, simply given
his S as it then was, that he had more reason to act in this way than to do
anything else.”44 By this, he did not mean that some internal reasons are
only pro tanto (which would have been a non sequitur), but that to pres-
ent someone with reasons for them to have acted otherwise is only to
imply that they could have reached that decision via sound deliberation,
not necessarily that they would have. Thus, William writes,
What we are blaming him for may not be a failure to recognize what
he then had most reason to do; even in cases in which there is a di-
rectly appropriate motivation in the agent’s S, not every failure to
act appropriately is simply the product of deliberative failure. Our
thought may rather be this: if he were to deliberate again and take
into consideration all the reasons that might now comemore vividly
before him, we hope that he would come to a different conclusion;
and it is important that the reasons that might now come more viv-
idly before him include this very blame and the concerns expressed
in it. This kind of thought helps us to understand a sense in which
focussed blame asks for acknowledgment.45
43. Williams, “Values, Reasons,” 116.
44. Williams, “Internal Reasons,” 42.
45. Ibid.
872 Ethics July 2017
From this Williams concludes that proleptic blame “involves treating the
person who is blamed as someone who had a reason to do the right thing
but did not do it.”46 Here, however, he misrepresented a key implication
of his view. We may hope that the person who is blamed would come to a
different conclusion, but we also fear that they won’t. Addressed blame
combines concern and hostility because it registers both possibilities.
It involves treating the offender as occupying an unstable, liminal posi-
tion, partway between that of a victim of deliberative failure and that
of a hard case—or, in Margaret’s now strikingly apt phrase, as “muddled,
criminally muddled.”47 That is, it involves treating them as someone who
may or may not turn out to have had a reason to do the right thing, de-
pending on how they respond to one’s blame itself.
More precisely, blame is appropriately addressed to an offender just
in case their failure to give weight to certain considerations threatens to
impair some relationship you have with them, in virtue of raising ques-
tions about their values that may reasonably be treated as unanswerable
until the agent deﬁnitively commits to either afﬁrming or rejecting the
considerations in question. In general, this will be the case whenever of-
fenders fall between two extremes: they neither are hard cases nor offend
under conditions of ignorance or handicap that wouldmake it unreason-
able for anyone to regard their conduct as even indirectly expressive of
their values.48 (Tellingly, these will include more or less the received range
of excusing and exempting conditions.)
To see what it is for an offense to threaten an impairment in this
way, we can draw on Scanlon’s view of blame, of which we saw Margaret’s
ﬁnal rejection of Henry to be a paradigm case. Recall that for Scanlon,
blame is warranted when a person’s conduct reveals attitudes that impair
the relationships one has or could have toward them. While the kinds of
attitudes that can impair relationships are not limited to an agent’s val-
ues, they certainly include them. Thus, in rejecting Henry, Margaret
takes his offense to reveal facts about his values that make him someone
she can’t love as a husband, and she revises her intentions and expecta-
tions accordingly. But it should now be apparent that the reason why
Scanlon’s view ﬁts so neatly here is that Henry’s values with respect to
his conduct had become basically determinate. While Margaret is angry,
however, these values aren’t—or, at least, she has no reason to treat them
46. Ibid.
47. Nate Sharadin reminds me that in Forster’s A Room with a View, the term “muddle”
is used repeatedly and prominently enough to constitute a theme; it consistently refers to
cases where a character’s priorities are vague and unsettled.
48. To be clear, I am not claiming that addressing blame to offenders presupposes
that their relevant values are indeterminate. This, I think, would overintellectualize the
facts. Rather, I am claiming that doing so is appropriate whenever the possibility of inde-
terminacy is neither irrelevant nor reasonably ruled out.
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as such. Rather, she treats the relation between Henry’s conduct and his
values as an open question, to be answered only after he has committed
to either accepting or rejecting her blame. His conduct does not as yet
embody values that would impair her relationship with him—it does
not as yet show him to be someone she can no longer love as a hus-
band—but it threatens to.49
Now, as we’ve seen, conduct that embodies relationship-impairing
values normally does not provide reason to care about the offender’s rec-
ognition. However, conduct that threatens to embody them does. To the
extent that we specify our values in response to particular cases, it will
only be by way of an offender’s afﬁrmation of the considerations they
are blamed for neglecting that the threat posed by their offense can
be negated. Since reason to care about a thing implies reason to care
about the negation of threats to it, your reason for caring about an of-
fender’s recognition derives from your reason for caring about your re-
lationship with them. And insofar as an offender’s actual attitudes still
provide them with at least a potential basis for having the values your re-
lationship with them requires, whatever reason you have for caring about
that relationship persists. Because their conduct doesn’t determinately
embody their values, the offender can’t be written off as a hard case.
On the other hand, because their conduct also doesn’t determi-
nately not embody their values, it can’t be written off as a deliberative
mistake. This is what explains addressed blame’s element of hostility.
While you do not have reason to revise your attitudes toward the offender
in the ways a defect in their values would warrant, you also do not have
reason to respond favorably toward them in the ways you would if their
underlying values were in good shape. In effect, the relationship remains
in place, but parts of it become unnavigable. The more salient these
parts become, the more your relationship’s normal concerns are put
on hold until the matter of your blame is dealt with. What would other-
wise be reasons to be loving or friendly or polite are trumped by reasons
to confront offenders, to show them what their conduct means to you as
forcefully and vividly as possible, and to let them make of it what they
will. This is why addressed blame essentially involves what Strawson called
49. Note that this is not a counterexample to Scanlon’s view: conduct warranting
addressed blame certainly reveals relationship-impairing attitudes, just not relationship-
impairing values. As such, I follow Miranda Fricker in viewing Williams’s and Scanlon’s ac-
counts as complementary: each focuses on different but related aspects of a single complex
phenomenon; see Miranda Fricker, “The Relativism of Blame and Williams’s Relativism of
Distance,” Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 84 (2010): 151–77, esp. 170–
71. One notable locus of support is that the proleptic case explains how blame can be spe-
cially focused on particular acts or omissions, thereby avoiding what Scanlon admits to be a
revisionary consequence of his view (see Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, 157–59).
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an “at least partial and temporary withdrawal of good will,”50 but it is also
why this withdrawal is emotionally engaged and confrontational in ways
that mere uncertainty about an impairment couldn’t account for on
its own.
It is probably worth stressing at this point that most cases of ad-
dressed blame are neither as drastic nor as intimate as Margaret’s. Sup-
pose you and I are colleagues, and I promise to water your plant while
you’re away. But I forget, and it dies. Clearly, my omission would not raise
any question whether I in fact had most reason to keep my promise—of
course I did. Nevertheless, if you got angry with me for this—and if your
anger consisted in blame addressed to me, rather than just frustration at
the situation—it would mean that you could not write off my omission as
entirely uncharacteristic. Rather, you would see it as raising certain ques-
tions about just how important promises of that kind (or plants, for that
matter) actually were to me. Until these questions were settled, you would
be unable to fully make sense of my conduct and its meaning for our rela-
tionship.
Naturally, sometimes these questions can never be settled. In Sec-
tion I, I allowed that blame may sometimes appropriately be addressed
to offenders when one should not or cannot express it to them, as with
the distant and the dead; when we address blame in these cases, it is be-
cause we are left unable fully to make sense of an offense’s meaning for a
relationship we nevertheless retain reason to care about. But I also said
that it is part of the nature of addressed blame that the failure to express
it is frustrating, and I doubt that its emotional andmotivational structure
can be fully understood independently of the role it characteristically
plays when it is expressed. In this it constitutes an invitation and a warn-
ing at once, in a way that itself preﬁgures and partly determines one’s
ongoing relationship to the offender. On the one hand, because offend-
ers are presumed to have some evaluative basis for afﬁrming the neglected
considerations, addressing blame to them invites them to do so in the
manner of an opening move in a musical improvisation or a spontane-
ous game of make-believe—where you play something you hope others
will be moved to complement, or pretend that something is true (“this
cardboard box is a spaceship!”) in the hope that others will be moved
to play along. On the other hand, because offenders are not presumed
to have an evaluative basis only for such afﬁrmation, addressed blame
also functions as a warning about what will happen if they don’t. As such,
its element of emotional vulnerability expresses a willingness, should the
invitation be accepted, to treat the neglected considerations as if they
were the offender’s reasons—which consists, among other things, in be-
50. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 21.
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ing open to forgiveness.51 Correspondingly, its element of hostility ex-
presses a willingness, should the invitation be rejected, to reject the of-
fender in turn. In fact, the expression of a willingness to do each of
these things grounds a signiﬁcant dimension of the inﬂuence addressed
blame may be hoped to exert. As Williams recognized, there is a differ-
ence between merely wanting to meet the expectations of certain others
and caring about relating to them according to mutually recognized
standards.52 Someone whose reasons against offending are indetermi-
nate in themselves, but who determinately values the latter, will be reli-
ably (albeit indirectly) inclined to take up the invitation on offer.
In these and similar cases, the proleptic mechanisms of punitive
and addressed blame can feed into one another. This is important to
both the phenomenology and function of blame, and more generally
as an illustration of what Williams called the “intelligible mystery or ob-
scurity of blame’s operations.”53 Blame can be, and often is, many things
at once. It can be both addressed to offenders and addressed to others,
both a sincere communication of reasons and an implicit application of
power—of shame or fear—to make its addressees more receptive to
those reasons than they might otherwise have been. The fact that we typ-
ically don’t know exactly what our blame is doing, or perhaps even what
we want it to do, reﬂects the “vagueness or indeterminacy of our practice
and experience” that Williams upheld as “an advantage of the internalist
account.”54
VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROLEPTIC BLAME
I want to ﬁnish by discussing two implications of my view that strike me as
noteworthy. One concerns blame’s connection to rationality; the other,
its connection to freedom.
A. Blame and Reasons
In a section of On What Matters entitled “The Unimportance of Internal
Reasons,” Derek Parﬁt argues that internalism implies, implausibly, that
the claim that someone has most reason to do something only amounts
to a psychological prediction: it is to imply that “this act would best fulﬁl
that person’s fully informed telic desires, or is what, after fully informed
and procedurally rational deliberation, this person would bemost strongly
51. Interestingly, forgiveness can itself function as a proleptic response to indetermi-
nacy, as AndreaWestlund argues in “Anger, Faith, and Forgiveness,”Monist 92 (2009): 507–
36. This leads to familiar and difﬁcult questions about the “elective” character of forgive-
ness that I won’t attempt to answer here.
52. This is an important theme in Williams, Shame and Necessity, chap. 4.
53. Williams, “Internal Reasons,” 44.
54. Ibid., 43.
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motivated to do, or would choose to do.”55 I agree that if this is what
internalism implied, internal reasons would not be important. But it isn’t,
and Williams didn’t think it was. Blame shows how much turns on the dif-
ference.
However, the importance of this point generalizes. Williams writes,
A rather similar structure can apply to advice . . . for even when we
are advising in the “if I were you”mode, our claim that the agent has
most reason to J does not necessarily mean that simply given his S
as it is, it already determines that J-ing has priority over anything
else. We are saying that the conclusion to J, rather than to do some-
thing else, can be reached from his S by a sound deliberative route,
and that is something that involves such things as the exercise of his
imagination and the effective direction of his attention. But among
the things that will affect his imagination and his attention, we hope,
is our advice itself and how it represents things.56
So many everyday internal reasons claims—I suspect the vast majority of
them—are not implicit psychological predictions at all. They presup-
pose a basis in the subject’s values but by no means presuppose that
the subject’s values already determine the response they recommend.
This yields a general picture of shared practical reasoning I ﬁnd salutary.
In particular, it offers an account of how we can acquire genuinely new
reasons through deliberating with one another that avoids familiar
problems with both standard versions of internalism and their external-
ist rivals. On the former, it is unclear how reasoning with others can ef-
fect changes to their fundamental ends, rather than just to their concep-
tions of the means to them; on the latter, it is controversial whether these
changes can be effected without appealing to a sui generis faculty of in-
tuition whose operation outwardly resembles brute conversion. But if, as
I believe, rational indeterminacy is more the rule than the exception,
then people who draw your attention to certain considerations—whether
in blame or through friendly advice—can be doing more than merely in-
forming you of means to your ends, without thereby invoking consider-
ations which need have no basis in them at all. They may rather be inviting
you to afﬁrm considerations that either could or could not count as rea-
sons relative to your subjective values—and thus to bring your respective
reasons into closer alignment. This possibility is particularly important in
55. Derek Parﬁt, On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2:276; my
emphasis. As Stephen Finlay and Mark Schroeder’s encyclopedia article on the subject at-
tests, formulations like Parﬁt’s are standard; see Stephen Finlay and Mark Schroeder, “Rea-
sons for Action: Internal vs. External,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2012
edition, ed. EdwardN. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/reasons
-internal-external.
56. Williams, “Internal Reasons,” 42.
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the ethical case, where it enables people to collaboratively construct, re-
vise, and sustain expectations whose subjective authority need neither sim-
ply express their prior interests nor depend on nonrational mechanisms
of conversion or correction.57
Admittedly, this doesn’t touch Parﬁt’s main objection, which is that
internalism doesn’t let us claim that there are some reasons people have
regardless of their attitudes. As I said, my aim has not been to defend
internalism, and I will not try to defeat the objection here. Nevertheless,
I think that a proper appreciation of the ﬂexibility and power of internal
reason claims—and of the moral psychology of blame—should at least
raise suspicions about it. For example, on one inﬂuential version of the
objection, the problem is that internalism can’t account for the universal-
ity of speciﬁcally moral reasons, which is in turn implied by (moralized)
resentment: resenting a wrong presupposes that the agent had reason
not to do it, yet it can be appropriate regardless of whether the agent is
a hard case.58 In my view, there are both phenomenological and ethical
considerations that count strongly against conceiving resentment in these
terms. Phenomenologically, it takes the plausible point that resentment
always consists in addressed blame and oversimpliﬁes it, ignoring the dif-
ference between the blame we address to offenders and the comparatively
impersonal, condemnatory blame we address to third parties or to our-
selves. Ethically, it ignores the value of the rich intersubjective relations
that the difference between these forms of blame reﬂects. So why not
say that insofar as hard cases merit resentment, this is precisely because
they lack the reasons that, from the perspective to which our resentment
is addressed, they ought to have?59
B. Blame and Freedom
More speculatively, it seems to me that the special but complicated sig-
niﬁcance of addressed blame is also reﬂected in blame’s intuitive con-
nection to the free will problem. Notoriously, it can be natural to think
57. Compare Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1985), 193: “[Blame’s proleptic function] is specially important
in helping to mediate between two possibilities in people’s relations. One is that of shared
deliberative practices, where to a considerable extent people have the same dispositions
and are helping each other to arrive at practical conclusions. The other is that in which
one group applies force or threats to constrain another. The ﬁction underlying the blame
system helps at its best to make a bridge between these possibilities, by a process of contin-
uous recruitment into a deliberative community. At its worst, it can do many bad things,
such as encouraging people to misunderstand their own fear and resentment—sentiments
they may quite appropriately feel—as the voice of the Law.”
58. See, e.g., R. Jay Wallace, “The Argument from Resentment,” Supplement to the Pro-
ceedings of The Aristotelian Society 107 (2007): 295–318.
59. Compare Kate Manne, “Internalism about Reasons: Sad But True?,” Philosophical
Studies 167 (2014): 89–117.
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that you can really be morally responsible for your conduct only if it is
free, or “up to you,” in some robust sense—a sense that can seem, at least
prima facie, to be incompatible with determinism. Also notoriously, many
philosophers have offered accounts of the freedom in question meant to
dispel this appearance of incompatibility, but which have seemed to many
of those most anxious about the problem to completely miss the point.
Now, I think that anxiety about freedom and determinism comes
frommany sources, and I don’t think that it is either possible or desirable
to give an account that would satisfy everyone. However, I suggest that a
major source of the trouble is that moral responsibility in the richest
sense really does require a kind of indeterminism, but an indeterminism
at the level of reasons rather than the level of causes. It is very easy to mix
the two up, however, and blame’s dark side makes it even easier.
What I mean by “blame’s dark side” is the increasingly popular idea
that the blame “at issue in the free will debate,” as Derk Pereboom puts it,
“is set aside by the notion of basic desert.” Explaining the notion, Pere-
boom claims that “the attitudes of moral resentment and indignation in-
clude the following two components: anger targeted at an agent because
of what he’s done or failed to do, and a belief that the agent deserves to be
the target of that very anger just because of what he’s done or failed to
do,” though he says surprisingly little about what these things supposedly
involve.60 But because Pereboom thinks that desert imposesmetaphysical
requirements on agency so demanding that we couldn’t possibly satisfy
them, hemust have somethingmore inmind than the trivial but everyday
condition (applied, e.g., when we say that a dangerous animal deserves to
be feared) that our emotions ﬁt their objects. Perhaps he thinks, as many
people have, that moral anger involves a primitive desire that its target be
harmed or punished.61 In that case, I could at least see the beginning of
an argument for incompatibilism: insofar as desert concerns the distribu-
tion of beneﬁts and harms, there is reason to think that any kind of re-
sponsibility associated with it must be at least largely a causal matter.62
But as we’ve seen, Margaret’s anger involves a desire for nothing of the
kind. For Henry to deserve to be the target of her anger is for his recog-
nition to be worthy of her concern, given what it or its refusal wouldmean
for his underlying values and, consequently, for their relationship. The
truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant.
60. Pereboom, Free Will, 2, 128.
61. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, “Transitional Anger,” Journal of the American Philosoph-
ical Association 1 (2015): 41–56.
62. While the details vary with particular conceptions of desert and the moral views
undergirding them, I take it that a connection between desert and causal responsibility
is supportable by a requirement of a fair opportunity to avoid harm or by broadly juridical
notions of ownership and compensation.
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However, the intelligible obscurity of blame does suggest a broadly
Nietzschean explanation why onemight see things differently. Addressed
and punitive blame are dangerously easy to conﬂate, and the inclination
to the latter is all too human. When people offend against you, it is very
understandable to want, as Walter Sobchak wants, to be someone they
had reason—any reason—to treat better. Even if you can’t be someone
your antagonists respect, you can at least be someone they shouldn’t mess
with. The problem is that this impulse tends not to hold up to reﬂection.
Thus, the idea that offenders deserve to suffer, as a matter of basic norma-
tive fact, constitutes an enormously convenient rationalization—a ratio-
nalization plausibly sustained by many moral, legal, and religious atti-
tudes and practices concerning responsibility.63
To be fair, Pereboom is not very enthusiastic about desert, and he
might well respond by arguing that rebarbative though the notion may
be, it nevertheless best represents the main concerns driving the histor-
ical debate. However, this would be a mistake. It would conﬁne the free
will problem to a narrow and controversial family of views, and the prob-
lem is bigger than that. It is one of the oldest and most gripping prob-
lems in philosophy, and its appeal is wide and deep. Thus, Robert Nozick
writes,
Philosophers often treat the topic of free will as a problem about
punishment and responsibility: how can we punish someone or hold
him responsible for an action if his doing it was causally determined,
eventually by factors originating before his birth, and hence outside
his control? However, my interest in the question of free will does not
stem from wanting to be able legitimately to punish others, to hold
them responsible, or even to be held responsible myself. Without free
will, we seem diminished, merely the playthings of external forces.
How, then, can we maintain an exalted view of ourselves? Determin-
ism seems to undercut human dignity, it seems to undermine our
value.64
Nozick’s attitude is not idiosyncratic. “Free will has been traditionally
conceived as a kind of creativity,” Robert Kane writes, “akin to artistic cre-
ativity, but in which the work of art created is one’s own self. As ultimate
creators of some of our own ends and purposes, we are the designers of
63. Compare Williams on ressentiment, as expressing—when the offender “is not dis-
posed to give compensation or reparation, and the victim has no power to extract any such
thing from him”—the “fantasized, magical” idea “that I, now, might change the agent from
one who did not acknowledge me to one who did” (Williams, “Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral
Psychology,” in Making Sense of Humanity, 65–76, 73).
64. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981), 291.
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our own lives, self-governing, self-legislating—masters, to some degree,
of our own moral destinies.”65
But while the responsibility required by conceptions of basic desert
may well be causal, the special dignity afforded by self-creation is a differ-
ent story. It seems to me that this dignity would only be cheapened if it
were involved in a point of view of people deﬁned by an interest in what
they cause and are caused by: this would be too much like the point of
view we take toward things we want to predict and control. Rather, it seems
more at home in a point of view of people deﬁned by an interest in the
reasons on which they act and in the selves they express through doing
so. To be a self-creator, recognized from this point of view, is to be the cre-
ator not of the states that cause your conduct, but of the values your con-
duct embodies.
Self-creation at the causal level is often, and I think correctly, argued
to be unintelligible: in order for an act of self-creation to be something you
are responsible for, rather than a mere random occurrence, it must itself
be suitably caused by certain facts about you. But in order for you to be re-
sponsible for these further facts, they too must be so caused, and since
nothing can be causa sui, the result is a regress.66 But at the rational level,
the parallel argument does not apply: one can, as it were, be ratio sui. And
this, I have argued, is exactly what addressed blame requires. For offenders
to be appropriate addressees of blame, it is not necessary that they could
have done otherwise consistently with the laws of nature and all the ante-
cedent facts about their bodies and environments. However, it is necessary
that they could have done otherwise consistently with the laws of rational-
ity and all the reasons entailed by their antecedent values and circum-
stances.67 Moreover, it is necessary that they could have done otherwise
in a way fully attributable to them—as expressing what turned out to be
their strongest reasons relative to their values. And ﬁnally, because these
values are determined retrospectively by the agents themselves, through
their processes of specifying them, it is necessary that the selves to which
their actions are attributable be selves of their own creation.68
Standardly, compatibilists conceive moral responsibility in terms of
some capacity to respond to antecedently given reasons, ﬁxed either by
65. Robert Kane, The Signiﬁcance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996),
81.
66. See, e.g., Galen Strawson, “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical
Studies 75 (1994): 5–24.
67. Compare Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990), who defends a psychological version of the requirement on which “it would have
been equally compatible with their psychological histories in conjunction with the psycho-
logical laws applying to them that [agents] had chosen something else” (103).
68. In my “Loving Someone in Particular,” I suggest that much the same is true of
interpersonal love.
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the agent’s prior psychological states or by independent normative facts.
Like others, I ﬁnd this view unsatisfying. At most, it artiﬁcially upholds
“bondage to the highest” as “identical with true freedom.”69 So I think
that incompatibilists are right that any account of responsibility that de-
nies a place for indeterminacy or self-creation is missing something vital.
No such account can capture the drama of responsible agency, the sense
of uncertainty and tension that blame distinctively registers. But the
incompatibilists are wrong, I’ve suggested, about the source of the prob-
lem. Blame in the richest sense requires more than the capacity to re-
spond to antecedently given reasons, but not because we must have
the causal freedom to determine whether or not we exercise this capacity
or because we must be causally responsible for its existence. Rather, we
must have the normative freedom to determine what count as reasons
for us in the ﬁrst place and so be normatively responsible for the selves
we create in doing so.
69. William James, “The Dilemma of Determinism,” in The Will to Believe (London:
Longmans, Green, 1896), 145–83, 149.
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